There is a widespread feeling at the level of both
governments and experts that the existing monetary and financial
arrangements need extensive reforms to enable the international economy to
sustain growth at a respectable rate in a milieu of stability; there is
also an acute realisation now about maintaining the quality of growth.
While monetary stability, macro-economic discipline and
efficiently working market mechanisms are essential for countries that
embrace globalisation, these are not sufficient. These have to be
supplemented by policies that promote equity. In many countries the
quality of growth is suffering from widening distributional inequalities,
high unemployment and stagnant real wages for unskilled workers. A large
number of countries are also suffering from poor governance, corruption
and crime.
The issues relating to global financial and monetary
reforms can be broadly classified as follows:
(1) The exchange rate system
(2) The management of the global capital market
(3) The role of the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)
(4) Development finance for low income countries
(1) The exchange rate system
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods regime based
on a par value system linked to the United States dollar in 1971, most
countries of the world have settled for floating exchange rates.
In reality so far as exchange rate management by
leading industrial countries is concerned, the period since August, 1971
has been one of muddling through. It has, however, become quite obvious
that the present non-system carries considerable cost in the form of
excessive volatility of floating rates, particularly as between the United
States dollar, the Euro and the Japanese yen.
The character of the exchange rate regime has special
significance for developing countries and transition economy countries
where exchange rate management has an important role in the fight against
inflation.
It remains to be seen whether in the foreseeable
future, despite a strong desire for a more stable exchange rate regime,
the leading industrial countries will have the will and the skill to
fashion such a system. In a world in which monetary power is more widely
dispersed, the management of a more stable regime of exchange rates will
depend not only on the preferences of a dominant power but on the
negotiations of several powers, primarily the United States, the European
Union and Japan.
(2) Management of the Global capital market
The elimination of capital controls by industrial
countries and a large number of developing countries as well as revolution
in information and computer technologies have completely transformed the
global capital market.
The management of private capital flows is one of the
crucial issues of the international financial system.
The vulnerability of economies to outflows and
speculative inflows of hot money has also increased considerably as a
result of liberalisation and greater integration of the global financial
system.
The Mexican, East Asian, Russian, Argentinean and
Brazilian crises have provided vivid examples of this danger. Policy
autonomy in a de-regulated and open financial system is also greatly
circumscribed. It can only respond passively to sudden inflows and
outflows of external funds. Stock markets too, are prone to shocks that
stem from the sudden movements of a large volume of funds. The recent
experience of equity markets in many developed as well in developing
countries has highlighted the de-stabilising aspect of this risk.
It has been proposed that the resources available to
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should be sufficiently enlarged to
enable it to help countries overcome the speculative pressures on their
balance of payments stemming from unexpected developments.
The IMF while performing its surveillance function is
now, inter-alia, focusing on the appropriate sequencing of capital account
liberalisation and helping countries to ensure the resilience of the
economy particularly of the financial sector to possible shocks.
The IMF is also trying to improve the reporting and
monitoring of capital flows, particularly with respect to inter-bank
credit lines.
(3) The role of the SDRs
In 1969, the IMF created the SDR as an international
reserve asset -- official holdings of gold, foreign exchange and reserve
positions in the IMF. The IMF allocates SDRs to its members in proportion
to their IMF quotas. A member that acquires SDRs in excess of its
allocation receives interest.
After the second amendment to the Articles of Agreement
in 1978, the SDR has become an international unit of account. Agreement to
allocate SDRs has been reached on only two occasions; the first was in
1970, the second was in January 1981 when SDRs 12.1 billion were allocated
to the IMF’s then 141 members, bring the total allocations to SDRs 21.4
billion.
The SDR value is based on the value of a basket of
currencies. Movements in the exchange rate of any one component currency
will tend to be partly or fully offset by movements in the exchange rate
of other currencies. Thus the value to the SDR tends to be more stable
than that of any single currency in the basket, which makes the SDR a
useful unit of account.
The case in favour of fresh SDR allocation is quite
strong and is based on the following considerations:
(i) The demand for reserves will grow significantly in
the future in line with the expansion of world trade and international
transactions.
(ii) A significant proportion of the increased demand
for reserves will arise on account of the need of developing countries and
countries in transition. About 30 per cent of developing and transition
countries have reserve holdings equivalent to less than eight weeks of
imports of goods and services. To acquire the additional reserves to reach
their desired level, the countries have to follow policies such as import
compression that damage the world economy and their growth prospects.
(iii) The element of stability in the supply of
reserves provided by a SDR allocation reduces the vulnerability of
economies that rely heavily on private sources of credit when their
reserve needs increase unexpectedly.
(iv) A fresh SDR allocation would help in achieving the
objective of making the SDR the principal reserve asset of the
international monetary system as mandated by the Articles of Agreement of
the IMF.
The rich industrial countries comprising the United
States, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy and Australia,
however, have opposed a fresh SDR allocation on the grounds that it world
be inflationary and that there is no longer global liquidity need to
supplement international reserves.
(4) Development finance for low-income countries:
The joint Fund–Bank Ministerial Group known as the
Development Committee has been considering issues connected with the
provision of development assistance to low income countries. Unfortunately
so far as Official Development Assistance (ODA) is concerned, its
magnitude is only around one-third of the desired target of 0.7 per cent
of GNP of rich industrial countries. A great portion of ODA is politically
motivated.
The funds provided by the IMF, World Bank and regional
development banks have often conditionalities attached to them which
generate political resistance in the recipient countries; there has also
been an unfortunate tendency on the part of international financial
institutions to expand the scope of their conditionalities to such
sensitive issues as defence expenditures and legal reforms.
The developing countries also feel that their
participation in the decision-making process of the Bretton Woods
institutions should be enhanced.
The developing countries would also like to link the
fresh creation of SDRs to the provision of development assistance to low
income countries. They have also been persistently demanding an
enlargement of various IMF facilities as well as more flexibility in their
use so that they can count on maintaining their trade, employment,
generation and development efforts at a high level. They have often
protested at the social and political costs imposed by the IMF adjustment
and poverty reduction programmes and have urged the setting up of an
advisory committee of the independent experts to help IMF and the World
Bank in appraising the needs and circumstances of the developing countries
and in devising ‘ideology free’ adjustment, poverty reduction and
growth promotion measures. Finally, the developing countries would very
much welcome quick and meaningful action by G-7, the IMF and the World
Bank to resolve the external debt problem of the low income developing
countries. They have often pleaded that a developing country’s debt
service should be linked to the level of resources it needs to maintain
increase in per head income at the socially necessary rate which is at
least 3 per cent per head annually.