security
Soft on borders
Our political and military leadership must fall in line on the contentious issues
By Dr Arif Azad
In 1995, Bosnian film director Emir Kusturica created a stir in the world of cinema with Underground, a film that covered a vast canvas of recent Yugoslavian history. The opening scene -- coinciding with Hitler's invasion of Yugoslavia -- shows a clutch of Communist party members rushing underground to mount resistance. Though the war outside ends, the bunker mentality persists. Marko, who assumes leadership of the underground movement, keeps his people in bondage convincing them of a perpetual war and a perpetual enemy outside. The fiction of a perpetual war is dutifully propagated which keeps most of them chained. Only once do they emerge from underground to discover that the world outside has changed beyond recognition, war having ended a long time back.

Unofficial forms of diplomacy
Civilian discourse coupled with the implementation of certain confidence building measures (CBMs) can do the needful
By Aoun Sahi
Most political pundits believe Track II and III diplomacy have played a major part in bringing India and Pakistan back on the table of talks.
"Since Mumbai attacks, the official contacts between the two countries had almost come to a halt; it was the Track II and III diplomacy and the people-to-people contact that helped ease tension on both sides of the border," says I A Rehman, veteran journalist and an active participant in the many forums on Indo-Pak friendship.

Curtains on Kashmir?
India's concern regarding the alleged infiltrations by Pakistani militants along the LoC is a major obstacle
By Waqar Gillani
During Musharraf's regime, India and Pakistan reached the understanding to resolve the Kashmir issue through demilitarisation, self-governance and joint mechanism. After Musharraf's resignation in 2007, however, the process came to a halt. Hopes were further squashed with November 2008 Mumbai attacks allegedly planned by Lashkar-e-Taiba -- a Pakistani militant organisation fighting Indian army in Kashmir. The recent meeting of Yousaf Raza Gilani and Manmohan Singh in Sharm El Sheikh, on the sidelines of the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, is a step towards possible resumption of talks. But the question is: will Kashmir again come into the spotlight?

Nothing works when it comes to bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. The trust deficit being at a level where a joint statement has to be explained or diluted if not outrightly rejected or retracted hours after being issued by at least one of the two parties. This is exactly what happened this time when the prime ministers of the two countries met on the sidelines of the Summit of Non-Aligned Movement in the Egyptian city of Sharm El Sheikh. The joint statement aimed to delink the action on terrorism from the resumption of Composite Dialogue Process. The way of dialogue that was suspended after the Mumbai attacks in November, 2008, was being projected as the way forward.

The Pakistani side rejoiced at the statement but the Indian prime minister had to bear huge flak domestically. He was accused of capitulation on the issue of terrorism and some even called it a failure of his foreign policy.

The truth is that Mumbai attacks gave new impetus to charges of cross-border terrorism that were by then levelled with less frequency against Pakistan. The threads were linked to the core Kashmir issue because the Indian side managed to capture one of the attackers alive while the Pakistani side looked clumsy distinguishing between the state and non-state actors. Indians felt justified in putting the blame on us for not being able to control the non-state actors. The initial response of the media on both sides was too 'statist' and belligerent.

We came to a near-war situation and back. But we could not begin with a clean slate because we share a history of wars and hostility. So the accusations of Indian involvement in Balochistan and Afganistan became louder from our side.

In the last two decades, though, we have created a new history. We have tried to create a new constituency -- of peace. We have increased the people to people contact manifold; we have put into practice many confidence building measures and we have made sure they are not stopped.

One area where we have not made enough progress is that of bilateral trade. Economic and cultural relations between us two neighbours will create a dynamic of its own which will lead to inevitable peace. Someone has to make a start there and in a way that such relations stay irreversible. Only this will defy the vested interest that does not want to see relations normalise between India and Pakistan. Ultimately trade may defeat terrorism and bring peace, the way it has in so many other regions of the world.

On July 16, 2008, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani met his Indian counterpart, Manmohan Singh, on the sidelines of the Summit of Non-Aligned Movement in the Egyptian tourist city of Sharam El-Sheikh. At that time, it appeared that the stalemate would continue -- something projected from the speeches made by the two prime ministers at the Summit, where both retained their old positions. However, the joint statement released after the meeting between two prime ministers threw some important news in the air.

The statement underlined the importance of dialogue, calling it the "only way forward." A major point added is the de-linking of "action on terrorism" from the resumption of Composite Dialogue process. The recent dialogues were suspended by India in the wake of Mumbai attacks in November 2008.

Since the suspension of dialogue, Pakistan left the resumption option with India. Thus, while Pakistan was on board, it was for India to decide about resuming the process. This provided a defensive posture to Pakistan, which would say to the international community that it is ready but India isn't. Just a month ago, in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg, Indian Prime Minister rejected President Zardari's proposal of resuming the dialogue. Today, the text accepts movement on the dialogues.

If India were to change its position, it may be reasoned as to why it called off the dialogues at first place. India's changing position stance owes to multiple factors which stand true not only of the recent statement, but also of its projected line.

First of all, given its increasing global stature, India has to become receptive to foreign actors. As India grows, an expectation is attached with India to play a lead role in major global issues. The difference in the reference to India as opposed to Pakistan is vivid in the global opinions. Unlike Pakistan which is pressed to behave more "responsibly", India is expected "to take more responsibility" on multiple global issues -- allaying fears of a neighbour being one of them.

Secondly, related to it is the role of the United States in pressing for peace building between the two South Asian countries. While the US wants Pakistan to fight the militants, it is equally ambitious of a long-term partnership with India. When Pakistan was recently under tremendous pressure to fight the militants, Pakistan's response smacked of obsession against India. It was after much assurance that Pakistan responded positively against the militants and launched an offensive against them; this pushed India to re-examine, even if through the US, the case of Pakistan. That Hillary Clinton's scheduled trip was to take place a day following the NAM summit must have compelled India to make Washington happy by listening to its assurances.

Lastly, domestic politics too played an important role in suspension and resumption of dialogue. Within months of the Mumbai attacks, India had to go for polls. Non-suspension of dialogue might have provided an upper-hand to the opposition parties in the elections. Now that Congress has re-won the elections, it need not be fearful for being chased out of power over being soft on security.

Criticism against Singh is clear from the response within India; the "disassociation clause" has stirred a debate inside India where critics have called it a failure of Singh's foreign policy. Singh, on the other hand, is cautious and, for domestic consumption, has reminded that the resumption of process is conditional to Pakistan's progress on the Mumbai probe. In this regard, the statement also mentions an assurance from Gilani that Pakistan will do "everything in its power" to bring Mumbai perpetrators to book.

India's opposition parties are not satisfied and have termed it as a major u-turn. L K Advani, leader of the opposition Bharatya Janata Party (BJP) has termed it a "capitulation" of the issue of terrorism.

Advani wants a non-negotiable primacy of terrorism over all other issues. His emphasis on terrorism was also vivid in the role over Agra Summit in 2001, where both Pakistan and India couldn't decide on "the core issues". Later on, Musharraf blamed it indirectly on Advani which scuttled the declaration; in response, Advani admitted his role but blamed Musharraf for being a slippery customer.

Back then, as later, cross-border terrorism remained a primary concern for India, while Pakistan wanted inclusion of Kashmir issue. With time, Pakistan had to question its beliefs -- something that happened in Musharraf's time with the initiation of talks in January 2004.

Presently, too, as could be read, the Gilani-Manmohan statement nowhere mentions Kashmir but can be rather interpreted in the term "outstanding issues". Moreover, the joint statement clearly mentions "terrorism to be a common problem" for both the countries. The idea of looking for winners and losers of the meeting is wrong, as a state-to-state statement is often a result of compromise.

Pakistan's realisation of terrorism being a threat took heavy toll on the state. It cost Pakistan a lot, in terms of casualties as well as international standing, to agree to the present position. Until very present, the societal fissure about terrorism being a priority remained highly conditional. Even the signals from Pakistan military were that unless political actors are on board, the fight against insurgency will not be fruitful. It was just a day next to Gilani-Manmohan meeting that Zardari's meeting with Sharif was followed by a communiqué which mentioned that "militancy posed the most serious threat to national country".

The confusion regarding militancy as a threat derived from Pakistan's threat perception against India was so strong that even the militancy inside Pakistan was often linked to India. Even today, the perception about links is present which may further strengthen the joint statement that calls for providing India with information on Balochistan and "other states". While there are some suggestions about the creeping of intelligence war in Balochistan, this shouldn't stop the state from introspection. Moreover, its association with militancy does not stand the ground. For both Pakistan and India, the supply of evidence is important.

Not all agree over the threat from India. Musharraf's recent statement in this regard suggests that it took him a long time to realise that extremism rather than India is a bigger threat to Pakistan. Within the government, President Zardari does not buy the "India as a threat" argument. When he (Musharraf) made the glorious utterance, it was suspected that it might be a slip of the tongue. When he repeated the statement, they dismissed him as "committing too much" or being "unaware of the dynamics". His peace overtures to neighbouring countries, notably India, Afghanistan, and Iran, were questioned on the grounds that Prime Minister, instead of President, should represent the country in a parliamentary democracy.

Compared to Zardari, Gilani didn't jump into much controversy when it came to foreign policy. Instead, his statements warned of being cautious against India. A case in point was the immediate sacking of Mehmood Ali Durrani, former national security adviser, who admitted that the sole alive attacker is a Pakistani by origin. Today, Gilani has put his signature on the text.

Pakistan will be hard-pressed to hasten on the Mumbai probe; any delay will question the intensions of Pakistan. The dialogue process must continue and shouldn't be locked with a phraseology or issue. It may be called something else but be moved on. The very aim of the dialogue is to look for solutions in the midst of the disagreement but by agreeing to the minimum common agenda.

Unofficial forms of diplomacy

Most political pundits believe Track II and III diplomacy have played a major part in bringing India and Pakistan back on the table of talks.

"Since Mumbai attacks, the official contacts between the two countries had almost come to a halt; it was the Track II and III diplomacy and the people-to-people contact that helped ease tension on both sides of the border," says I A Rehman, veteran journalist and an active participant in the many forums on Indo-Pak friendship.

Track II refers to a series of efforts to deal with or to avoid conflicts through non-governmental actors that usually have close links with the official policy-makers. It helps official channels to find a way out of difficult situations without a loss of face on either side, if the diplomacy fails. Track III is about efforts regarding conflict-avoidance or conflict-resolution undertaken by prominent non-governmental personalities, with or without links to the policy-makers, as part of their own initiatives.

I A Rehman does not believe that civilian discourse is a sentimental outpouring and a short-lived euphoria that would vanish easily if there are hurdles in the way of bonhomie between the two countries with a history of enmity. "Once such a discourse facilitates the unleashing of forces of trade and business, it acts as a significant brake on forces of hostility. Both civil society organisations and business bodies played a very vital role for the Agra Summit 2001," he tells TNS.

"It is right that Track II and III are unofficial forms of diplomacy but many of the individuals involved in these activities have the means to influence the official sources."

According to him, Track II diplomacy between Pakistan and India started in early 1990s in real terms. The formation of Pak-India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy in 1994 was a major breakthrough in this regard. "Governments always want a dialogue; it is the people's pressure that stops them from doing so. A growing constituency of peace is emerging amongst the people of Pakistan and India, and now the people of both countries have started pressing for a peaceful dialogue, thanks chiefly to the civil society organisations on both sides of the border."

A variety of South Asian non-governmental organisations and networks have been trying to pacify the relations between the two countries for a long time; many of them being very clear that the actual effort is going to be made on the official front.

"These could be building blocks for Track I," says Dr Abid Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute. "Sometimes different official channels ask Track II and III individuals to help them on certain issues in order to test the response of the second party. If their stance is too rigid, they try to avoid bringing up these discussions in official meetings.

"Doubts are often expressed as to the efficacy of the civilian discourse in improving relations between the two sides. Many think the people-to-people contact between India and Pakistan that began largely since 2002 has failed to create a cordial atmosphere between the two countries. In fact, civilian discourse coupled with the implementation of certain confidence building measures (CBMs) can do the needful."

Suleri further says that the governments of both India and Pakistan cannot take any "bold steps" due to political obligations. For instance, both governments want to withdraw their troops from the Siachen Glacier but they cannot because of pressure from within.

"In the year 2004, India proposed as many as 72 CBMs, covering such diverse fields as Jammu & Kashmir, peace and security, promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields, economic and commercial cooperation; only a few have been implemented so far, including the agreement on pre-notification of flight-testing of Ballistic Missiles, thereby reducing the risk from accidents related to nuclear weapons, reaffirmation by the two countries to uphold ceasefire and establishing different bus services between the two countries. In fact, both sides are required to concentrate more on non-military CBMs such as the promotion of trade, investment, technological collaboration, tourism and education. Military CBMs are always short-lived and are implemented to achieve immediate needs," he says, talking exclusively to TNS.

Interestingly, the feeling on the other side of border is no different. Pradeep Singh Mehta, Chairman, Advisory Board, South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics and Environment, says Track II and III have served the purpose well enough. The problem is, history cannot be altered.

One solution, says Mehta, could be to put disputes on the backburner and move ahead with renewed business and trade relations. "I don't want to say that the two countries can or should forget their outstanding issues; what I am suggesting is that these countries must not link mutual trade with the resolution of some very difficult issues. I am sure peace will follow if trade is allowed to grow freely. This is by no means a utopian idea. Brazil and Argentina, once sworn enemies, abandoned their nuclear programmes and concentrated on mutual trade. As a result, the smaller neighbouring countries in the region also benefited."

Formal trade between the two countries, according to Mehta, has been "awfully low, although a great potential to increase it exists.

"Trade between India and Pakistan, measured by the sum of their bilateral exports, is less than 1 percent of the total exports from India and Pakistan. It is just 4 percent of the equivalent measure of bilateral trade between Malaysia and China -- two countries of comparable GDP and proximity -- and only 9 percent of the equivalent measure of trade that occurs between Argentina and Brazil, other countries of comparable size."

He says when rivals indulge in trade, it may not necessarily guarantee peace, but good economics has often been known to promote good politics. So our civil society should also focus on the promotion of trade between the two countries.

I A Rehman goes along with the idea, saying the real breakthrough between the two countries can be achieved through trade and joint enterprise.

During Musharraf's regime, India and Pakistan reached the understanding to resolve the Kashmir issue through demilitarisation, self-governance and joint mechanism. After Musharraf's resignation in 2007, however, the process came to a halt. Hopes were further squashed with November 2008 Mumbai attacks allegedly planned by Lashkar-e-Taiba -- a Pakistani militant organisation fighting Indian army in Kashmir. The recent meeting of Yousaf Raza Gilani and Manmohan Singh in Sharm El Sheikh, on the sidelines of the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, is a step towards possible resumption of talks. But the question is: will Kashmir again come into the spotlight?

Musharraf's back-channel agreement, which was never announced, was based on three measures: demilitarisation on the both sides of the Line of Control (LoC), self-governance for the people of Kashmir and joint mechanism to monitor self governance.

In March 2007, a possible visit by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was under discussion but it did not take place; firstly, because of the Uttar Pradesh elections in India and, secondly, because of the subsequent judicial crisis in Pakistan. It had almost been understood that Kashmiris would be given special rights to move and trade freely on both sides of the LoC that separates India and Pakistan. Moreover, a joint body, consisting of local Kashmiri leaders, Indians and Pakistanis would oversee issues affecting people on both sides of the line.

The commencement of the Muzaffarabad-Srinagar bus service in April 2005 was also seen as an important development in this regard. The two sides agreed to operate an additional route between Poonch and Rawala Kot. Relationships between the two sides of Kashmir also improved. The two sides agreed to enhance interaction and cooperation across the LoC including meeting points for divided families, trade, pilgrims and cultural exchanges. They also agreed on a truck service which became operational, too.

"The best way forward after the two prime ministers' meeting in Sharm El Sheikh and a joint statement is to revive the three-track dialogue between India and Pakistan including composite dialogue, back-channel diplomacy and people-to-people contact," said Khalid Mahmood, former ambassador of Pakistan, who closely watched the Musharraf regime's policy on Kashmir.

This would transform the hostile nature of relations between the two countries and address the disputes that have bedevilled their relationship," he added. "There is a changing perspective on Pakistan's position with regard to the fight against terrorism. The Indian government should show statesmanship and take the relationship to a level where it leads to conflict resolution. In fact, the two neighbours could sign on the three possible agreements on Sir Creek, Siachen and Kashmir."

Since a lot of work was done during 2003 and 2007 these agreements could be negotiated, revived and finalised in near future. This would take the relationship into a new era of peace and prosperity in India, Pakistan and Kashmir, Mahmood said.

On the other side, India's concern regarding infiltrations by Pakistani militants in Kashmir is a major obstacle. The Mumbai attacks also put a huge question mark on Pakistan's ability to counter militancy and infiltration.

Javed Ashraf Qazi, former director general Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), is not in favour of talks on Kashmir in the present circumstances. "Pakistan should not negotiate under pressure. When you negotiate from a position of weakness, you end up as a loser," he said, adding, "Pakistan should talk to India minus Kashmir till it assumes a stronger position."

As far as the Mumbai attacks are concerned, he said, the Indian reaction has been rather "immature". "Even if some non-state actors have acted from Pakistan the state is not responsible for them. And moreover, it will also be wrong if India conditions talks and the Kashmir issue with the Mumbai thing.

"The state is not responsible for the non-state actors if they act in India or in Kashmir. And we believe India should take action against such culprits if it has proof. We believe Kashmir is not part of India. We morally support Indian Kashmir's cause of independence. If some organisation is infiltrating, the state cannot check them, as the border is very long. But we urge India to take tough action if some one is arrested."

Qazi said the insurgency in Kashmir had started back in 1989 and the state was trying to stop this. "I remember the advice of the Chinese defence minister from the time I was DG Military Intelligence. During the former's visit to Pakistan he asked Islamabad to be patient on Kashmir and wait for an appropriate time just as China had waited for Hong Kong.

"I believe a peaceful solution to the Kashmir issue may be possible if we can wait. India will disintegrate and Kashmir will automatically be independent," he said.